This article explains how homology theory can be applied to simplicial complex models of wireless communication networks to study their vulnerability to jamming. It develops two classes of invariants (one local and one global) for studying which nodes and links present more of a liability to the network's performance when under attack.
Following [2, 3] , we will declare that a network is vulnerable at a collection of links if their removal results in a disconnected network. Although this is a fairly drastic mode of failure (the loss of a few links can dramatically reduce the network capacity [4] without disconnecting the network), it is a failure that is easy to describe.
Although vulnerability to purely random failures has been extensively studied, Commander et al. [1] observe that vulnerability to an adversarial jammer has received little attention. Xu et al. [5] was one of the few works discussing jammers, from both the perspective of the attacker and defender.
Graph theory plays a central role in identifying critical nodes [4] -those through which a substantial amount of traffic passes. Because identifying these nodes is computationally difficult [6, 7] , our (more naïve) definition of vulnerability as causing disconnectedness avoids a combinatorial explosion. Although the use of graph theory is well-established in studying resource conflict in wireless networks [8, 9, 10, 11] , we are inspired by the detailed survey [12] , which states, "...problems over networks with randomly varying topology remains an under-explored area with little known results on models or methodologies."
Recently, vulnerability assessments [13, 14, 15, 16] have been performed successfully on networks with hierarchical structure using percolation theory. The earliest such paper on the subject [13] found that network topology is a performance driver for network robustness, since the property of connectedness plays an important role in their activation model. Specifically, nodes need to be connected to their local source else they deactivate. This is a good model for utility distribution networks, but is not consistent with ad hoc wireless network usage of broadcast resources.
The tools of topology have been used more extensively in sensor networks. Our simplicial complexes are inspired by the work of [17, 18, 19, 20] . Jamming and defense problems for sensor networks were discussed in [21, 22, 23] .
TWO SIMPLICIAL MODELS OF WIRELESS NETWORKS
Take the number of path components of a network as a measure of its health: fewer components is better. If there are multiple path components, there exist pairs of nodes which cannot communicate with each other, even through relays. We also make the following single channel assumption: if a link connected to a node is jammed, then that node cannot receive transmissions from any other node.
Definition 1.
A wireless network vulnerability is its susceptibility to becoming disconnected when a single source of interference is present.
This article presents techniques for identifying these vulnerabilities within a simplicial model of the network. We begin with a few preliminary definitions that are relevant to simplicial complexes.
Definition 2.
An abstract simplicial complex X on a set A is a collection of ordered subsets of A that is closed under the operation of taking subsets. We call an element of X which itself contains k +1 elements a k-cell. We usually call a 0-cell a vertex and a 1-cell an edge.
If a, b are cells with a ⊂ b, we say that a is a face of b, and that b is a coface of a. A cell of X that has no cofaces is called a facet.
The closure cl Y of a set Y of cells in X is the smallest abstract simplicial complex that contains Y . The star star Y of a set Y of cells in X is the set of all cells that have at least one face in Y .
Suppose a radio network consisting of a collection of nodes N = {n i } is active in a spatial region R. Assume all nodes communicate through a single-channel, broadcast
resource. An open set U i ⊂ R is associated to each node n i that represents its transmitter coverage region. (See Figure  1 .) For each node n i , a continuous function s i : U i → R represents its signal level at each point in U i . Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a global threshold T for accurately decoding the transmission from any node.
Briefly, the interference complex describes the lists of transmitters that when transmitting will result in at least one mobile receiver location receiving multiple signals simultaneously. (Without the constraint on the decoding threshold, the interference complex reduces to the well-knownČech complex [24] .) Proposition 4. Each facet of the interference complex corresponds to a maximal collection of nodes that mutually interfere.
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Link complex Coverage regions n 1 n 2 n 3 n 3 n 3 n 1 n 1 n 2 n 2 Fig. 1 . Transmitter coverage regions (left), the associated interference complex (middle), and link complex (right)
The link graph is the following collection of subsets of N :
The link complex L = L(N, U, s, T ) is the clique complex of the link graph, which means that it contains all elements of the form {i 1 , . . . , i n } whenever this set is a clique in the link graph.
Proposition 6. Each facet in the link complex is a maximal set of nodes that can communicate directly with one another (with only one transmitting at a time).
Corollary 7. Facets of the interfence and link complexes represent common broadcast resources.
Example 8. Figure 1 shows a network with three nodes. The coverage regions are shown at left for a given threshold T .
Since there are nonempty pairwise intersections between the coverage regions, but there is no common point of intersection for all three nodes, the interference complex (middle) contains no 2-cells. However, no pair of nodes can actually communicate, so the link complex consists of three isolated vertices.
GLOBAL VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT USING PERSISTENT HOMOLOGY
The interference caused by a transmission impacts the usability of the network outside of the transmission's immediate vicinity.
Definition 9. We call the star over a node n its region of influence. The region of influence of a facet F can be written as a union roi F = n∈F star cl n.
Interfering with a link removes it and its region of influence from the network. If the strength of the interference is unknown, it is more appropriate to assume that there is a filtration ∅ = L 0 ⊆ L 1 ⊆ . . . of open subcomplexes of the 
We usually think of elements of H k (X \ roi L Q ) as being part of a larger k-th persistent homology group H k (X \ roi L • ) associated to the entire interference filtration L • . Following standard practice [25, 26] , an element of a ∈ H k (X \ roi L • ) is said to be born at Q if a ∈ H k (X \ roi L Q ) is nontrivial, and its preimage is trivial in all H k (X \ roi L P ) with P < Q. Conversely, it is said to die at P if its image in H k (X \ roi L Q ) is zero for all Q > P . The difference between its birth and death is called its age.
Elements of the persistent homology group with larger ages represent "more significant" topological features in the data, because they are more robust to perturbations [27] . Consider the link complex of a random network N ⊂ R = R 2 shown Figure 2 and two interference sources located at a 1 , a 2 ∈ R 2 . To simulate varying levels of interference, the filtration L S,i = {n ∈ N : d(n, a i ) < S} was computed according to the Euclidean distance function d. Given this Fig. 3 . Persistence diagram (horizontal=birth radius, verti-cal=death radius) for connected components associated to the two jammers. Larger distance from the diagonal signifies the network is more vulnerable to a jammer information, Perseus [28] was used to compute the 0-th persistent homology of the remaining network I S = X \ roi L S,i for each of the two jammers. This software decomposes the persistent homology group into its set of generators, and displays the birth and death times corresponding to each.
Examination of the results (Figure 3) shows that the number of significant generators (farther from the diagonal) of H 0 (X \ roi L S ) depends strongly on the position of the jammer. In the case where the jammer is located near the narrow portion of the network at the center, there is a significant persistent generator. Communication from one half of the network to the other is impossible when the jammer is active. For the other case, when the jammer is located away from the narrow portion of the network, there are no significant generators. For a large range of interference strengths, the network remains connected. Because of this, the presence of more and older persistent generators indicates greater vulnerability to that particular interference source.
LOCAL VULNERABILITY ASSESMENT USING RELATIVE HOMOLOGY
The single channel assumption means that an attack on a facet L removes its region of influence from the network. There is a precise, relative homological bound on the number of components a network is split into under the influence of interference.
Example 11. A facet L is marked in each of the two networks shown in Figure 4 . If the region of influence of L is removed from the network in the network X at left, it becomes disconnected. But if removed from the network Y at right, it remains connected. Fig. 4 . Attacking a facet L in a straight-line (left) network X results in a network X \ roi L that is disconnected, but in a ring network Y (right) does not disconnect the network Theorem 12. Suppose that X is either a link or interference complex, and that L is a facet of X. If X is connected and roi L is a proper subset of X, the dimension of H 1 (X, X \ roi L) + 1 is an upper bound on the number of connected components that an attack on L cuts the network into. When H 1 (X) is trivial, that upper bound is attained.
The proof is a short computation using the long exact sequence for the pair (X, X \ roi L). This suggests that H k (X, X \ roi L) reports local vulnerabilities to the loss of k-way broadcast connectivity as well (a topic of future work).
Because of the excision property for relative homology, H k (X; X \ roi L) (for all k ≥ 0) only detects the immediate vicinity of the link, and is a generalization of vertex degree to higher dimensional complexes. This means that an algorithm can compute this invariant in a fast, decentralized manner.
Algorithm 13. For each facet L in X, 1. Construct the list of vertices V ⊂ X that either lie in L or have an edge that connects to L.
2. Construct a subcomplex Y ⊆ X whose simplices are precisely those with vertices that all are in V .
Return the dimension of
The number returned by this algorithm indicates the vulnerability of the network to attacks on L -greater numbers indicate increased vulnerability.
Example 14. Figure 5 shows the link complex of a random network. The facets of this complex are colored according to the dimension of H 1 (X, X \ roi L). Attacking links near the periphery of the network (to the left) cause the network as a whole to suffer less than an attack in the middle. Attacks on the middle facet result in multiple portions of the network becoming disconnected.
Example 15. The presence of loops farther from the link can provide back-up connections in the event of an attack, though these are not measured by H 1 (X; X \ roi L). Therefore, the presence of a nontrivial H 1 (X) appears to be protective (but is not a guarantee) of network robustness (see Figure 6 ).
Fig. 5.
Link complex in which each facet L is colored according to the dimension of H 1 (X, X \ roi L) (blue=0, green=1, red=2) Fig. 6 . Even though the graph for network X has nontrivial H 1 (X), attacking facet L results in a disconnected network
CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS
This article showed that a wireless communication network's vulnerability to jamming can be analyzed using simplicial complexes, persistent homology, and local homology. Our simplicial complex model of a network and homological analysis naturally includes higher dimensional data, but our analysis has treated low-dimensional homological data exclusively. Therefore, it is reasonable to continue our analysis into higher dimensions, aiming to assess decision thresholds and to study the higher homology groups themselves. Future work will also aim develop hybrid topological/geometric invariants that are additionally sensitive to the number of nodes impacted by the jammer.
